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INTRODUCTION
Mostly regarded as a cause célèbre among recent Supreme Court
opinions, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 1 is simply a course correction
in class action jurisprudence. Residing at the core of the Dukes opinion
is the Court’s growing disenchantment with the contemporary class
action’s certification process, which relies heavily on statistical
sampling. The Dukes Court’s denial of class certification has been
hailed as a game changer for class action litigation. 2 Yet, one of the
important rationales behind the Court’s decision to decertify the Dukes
class has not yet been adequately dissected. 3 In examining the
evolution of statistical methodology within modern class actions, this
Article establishes why Dukes readjusted this evolutionary contour.
Originally designed to enhance collective public benefit 4 and
envisioned as a procedural accelerant for imparting maximum benefit to
class members, 5 today’s class action has mushroomed into an
uncontrollable legal maneuvering. 6
Despite periodic legislative
1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. Andrew Longstreth, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Shakes up Employment Class Actions, THOMSON
REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/01_-_
January/Wal-Mart_v__Dukes_shakes_up_employment_class_actions/.
3. Although viewed as a game-changer within contemporary discourse, I view the significance
of Wal-Mart as an attempt by the Supreme Court to correct the trajectory of modern class action
litigation. To that objective, I examine an important, yet much less focused, area of class action
litigation strategy: using statistical evidence in pattern and practice discrimination. In doing so,
this Article dissects two threads. The first thread examines (both anecdotally and theoretically)
the issue of offering statistical proof to minimize individual issues. The second thread attempts to
establish the fundamental disconnect between trial by formula and substantive due process.
4. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good,
29 CARDOZO LAW REV. 2517 (2008); Owen W. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21 (1996).
5. See David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 564–67 (1987) (promoting an utilitarian objective of class actions in
seeking public welfare optimization through risk minimization).
6. Here, I draw attention to the fact that, despite measures taken over the last decades to rein
in class action litigation, courts have been generally sympathetic to plaintiffs’ right to bring class
action lawsuits. Legal strategies and innovations created along the way have also assisted in
engaging the court systems, especially at the district court level. See James D. Cox & Randall S.
Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since
Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 894 (2005) (commenting that a corporation is more likely
to face a securities class action lawsuit than a confrontation with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on enforcement).
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interventions, such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 7 and
the Class Action Fairness Act, 8 legal strategies for class actions have
continuously evolved over the last three decades. In this changing
landscape for class certification, statistical sampling has taken primacy
over due process. 9 That is to say, judicial economy has overshadowed
substantive law’s concerns. The seduction of procedural efficiency has
masked a mad rush to certify the greatest number of litigants possible,10
while also generating profitable business for class action lawyers. 11
Against this historical backdrop, this Article intends to examine the
context and genesis of statistical sampling procedures in class action
litigation. 12
7. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)). The PSLRA made substantive
changes to various federal securities laws to prevent plaintiffs’ lawyers from abusing securities
class actions. See Enzo Incandela, Comment, Recourse under § 10(B) on Life Support: The
Displacement of Liability and Private Securities Fraud Action after Janus v. First Derivative, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 935, 945–49 (2012) (“[T]he PSLRA attempted to stem the escalation of suits
brought by plaintiffs as an attempt to unearth fraud through discovery, which would, in turn, lead
to settlement. One of the most important legal changes to come from the PSLRA was the
heightening of pleading requirements.”).
8. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)). In part, Congress enacted the CAFA to
reduce the ability to bring class action lawsuits. See generally Danielle Kie Hart, Contract
Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 213 n.213 (2009).
9. In the absence of a definitive “bright line” ruling by higher federal courts, lower courts have
resorted to statistically based determinations of discrimination to establish the causal impact of
plaintiffs’ injuries. This Article shines the spotlight on this misguided overreliance.
10. See Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429, 429 (1986)
(“These mass tort claims have a number of similarities: they result in the filing of many suits;
they produce high litigation costs; they are generally resolved only after great delay; they affect
not only the litigants but other users of the court system; and their total human and economic
costs affect all of society.”).
11. See Richard B. Schmitt, Leaky System: Suits over Plastic Pipe Finally Bring Relief,
Especially for Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at A1; BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS
E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE
FOR JUDGES 22 (2005) (“In ‘mega’ cases, be prepared to see attorney requests for truly huge
amounts, up to hundreds of millions of dollars.”).
12. In part, this Article contends that courts have for too long been lenient in accepting
statistical proof in deciding pattern and practice discrimination cases. In other words, courts are
all-too frequently accepting marginal statistical evidence to draw inferences of discriminatory
behavior based on inadequate or erroneous sampling. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 101 (2009) (“[T]he
flashpoints today over class certification concern the role of aggregate proof of a statistical or
economic nature.”). See also In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 111
(D. Mass. 2009) (noting that plaintiffs in a pharmaceutical marketing class action offered
evidence based on statistical sampling to show that a marketing campaign caused an increase in
off-label drug prescriptions); In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 194 F.R.D.
484, 488 (D. N.J. 2000) (explaining that plaintiffs in a products liability class action offered
evidence based on statistical sampling to show that cars’ propensity to catch fire should constitute
definitive proof of common causation).
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It is generally accepted that class actions present an effective and
efficient mechanism for courts to adjudicate a large volume of injury
claims from a large number of plaintiffs. 13 Thus, class action litigation
can be an efficient and accelerated means to handle claims of pattern or
practice discrimination. The key to a class action is to effectively bind
such litigants. 14 Therefore, class action litigation is about aggregating
and combining numerous and common individual circumstances. Class
actions proceed through a certification process that attempts to bind the
plaintiffs by extracting their inherent commonality.
Finding appropriate commonality among litigants requires the
identification of a single claim or set of claims that may cohesively
combine litigants’ judicial aspirations, as opposed to a set of loosely
coupled individual aspirations. Therefore, before a class action trial may
begin, the judge must ensure that there exists cohesion and commonality
among the various class members. 15 However, since efficiency is at the
core of class actions, a judge cannot go through an exhaustive analysis
of each plaintiff’s allegations. Instead, the determination of
commonality involves selecting a representative subset from the larger
class and ensuring that the subset is an adequate representation of the
class. Commonality is established via statistics—a widely accepted,
and at times loosely implemented, methodology in modern class action
litigation. This Article calls for a re-examination of the process of
finding, and practice of showing, commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Class action litigation in the twenty-first century is big business,16
and the growing needs of a commerce-driven enterprise allowed
procedural economy to overshadow substantive law. Deviating from its
original goal of furthering collective public benefit, 17 contemporary
class action litigation has ushered in an exponential growth of
litigants—in part, as this Article contends, because of statistical
13. See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of
Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 619–21 (1993) (arguing for statistical methodology as a
tool to enhance the efficiency of aggregate litigation and to maximize participation from all
willing parties).
14. Id.
15. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038985.
16. See Schmitt, supra note 11 (examining a trend in class action litigation that often times
may be driven more by plaintiffs’ lawyers’ financial interests than those of the plaintiffs). See
also U.S. SEN. ARLEN SPECTOR, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005, S. REP. NO. 10914, at 14–20 (2005) (explaining how attorneys receive excessive fees, but that class members
receive little or no recovery).
17. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 20–22 (discussing how judicial blackmail forces settlements of
frivolous cases).
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modeling. 18 This focus on judicial efficiency has often come at the
expense of liberty and equality—the core principles of due process.19
This Article uses the Dukes decision as a lens to examine the
relationship between commonality and statistical sampling within the
context of class action litigation.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of Dukes. Next, Part
II traces the evolutionary path of statistical methodology in modern
class action litigation, while deriving linkages between commonality
and statistical sampling. Part III then delves into the core of statistical
deviations to better understand how plaintiffs provide evidence of
discrimination through statistical sampling. This Part sets the stage for
Part IV, which evaluates the due process concerns implicated by
statistical methodologies. Here, this Article explores in detail two
distinct phenomena in class actions: the use of statistical extrapolation
to develop a foundational understanding of how sampling may hinder
the due process rights of an individual litigant, and the interplay
between liberty, equality, and judicial economy. The Article concludes
by reiterating that the Supreme Court’s holding in Dukes is merely a
course correction to counter the unbridled use of statistics in class action
litigation.
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES
Some observations of the Dukes Court’s findings will help set the
18. Id. at 20–21 (“[S]tate court judges often are inclined to certify cases for class action
treatment not because they believe a class trial would be more efficient than an individual trial,
but because they believe class certification will simply induce the defendant to settle the case
without trial.”).
19. Liberty within the context of civil litigation means that every individual should have his or
her day in court. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4449, at 417 (1st ed. 1981). While the concept of liberty has remained fundamentally the same,
the doctrine of equality has taken various shades in its application within differing contexts.
Fundamentally, equality is premised upon ensuring that similar scenarios produce similar
outcomes. See William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory
of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 711 (2006). Yet, equality is often
viewed within a narrower prism. See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil
Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1865–67 (2002) (explaining the various implications of
equality and noting how scholarship often times espouses a narrower view of equality). Equality
is also seen through the prism of outcome consistency and linked with the liberty doctrine. See
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749–50 (2011) (viewing
equality and liberty as interconnected). There remains, however, some tension between the “day
in court” ideals of liberty and “equal treatment” conceptions of equality. See JACK B.
WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS,
CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 127 (1995) (showing how aggregation
cuts against common law’s ability for individual justice against injury). See also Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–47 (1999) (noting the “inherent tension” between class
representation and the “day-in-court” concept).
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stage before delving into the mechanics of class certification using
statistical sampling. In Dukes, the Supreme Court overturned class
certification for 1.5 million current and former female Wal-Mart
employees who alleged systemic gender discrimination in pay and
promotion opportunities. 20 By contending that pay and promotion
decisions were based on the subjective discretion of individual
managers, the plaintiffs sought compensation for Wal-Mart’s pattern
and practice of discrimination. 21 A few observations are relevant to this
Article. First, a 5-4 majority was not swayed by the statistical sampling
used by plaintiffs to draw an inference of class-wide discrimination.22
Specifically, the Court found that the class did not meet the threshold
requirement of commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). 23 More importantly,
the Court narrowed the threshold requirement of commonality for
certification by making clear that applicable common characteristics
should be capable of resolving a class-wide question of law or fact. 24
One goal of class certification is to select a set of class
representatives from a large universe of plaintiffs seeking judicial
adjudication of their grievances. The process of representation relies on
20. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010). See also Plaintiffs’
Third Amended Complaint at 3–9, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2002 WL 33645690 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (No. C01-2252 MJJ) (denoting the plaintiffs’ allegations of discrimination against
Wal-Mart).
21. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 578.
22. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2549–53 (2011). The Court then
denied class certification under Rule 23(b)(2). See id. at 2557–61.
23. See id. at 2556–57 (“Because respondents provide no convincing proof of a companywide
discriminatory pay and promotion policy, we have concluded that they have not established the
existence of any common question.”).
24. Id. at 2550–51. The plaintiffs in the case sought to interpret commonality based on
identifying questions applicable to the entire class, but the Court interpreted commonality to yield
common answers, not just questions that are common to the entire class. For example, “Has WalMart discriminated against women?” is a common question, but it may not yield common
answers; some store managers in some locations may have discriminated against some women
under certain circumstances, but other managers in different locations may have treated women
neutrally. Therefore, the Court held that any common element “must depend upon a common
contention.” Id. at 2551. This ruling means that if the plaintiffs had all shared the same
supervisor, they could argue that evidence of particular management practices would be common
to the group. Indeed, the Court observed that it would be far less likely, in a company as broad
and diverse as Wal-Mart, that all managers would discriminate against women. See id. at 2554
(“[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a
corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria
for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”). Thus, the Court
emphasized that commonality should be viewed as “capable of class-wide resolution which
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. at 2551. This sentiment has been echoed at the lower
court level. See Gaston v. Exelon Corp., 247 F.R.D. 75, 82 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“Plaintiffs could
simply propose the question ‘has employer discriminated against class members’ and always
meet the commonality requirement. Obviously, something more is necessary.”).
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finding a central element among the class members. Conceptually, this
central element must be so pervasive among the class that identifying
this characteristic would eliminate the need for an examination of all
individual members. 25 Thus, identification of commonality is the crux
of class litigation—the glue that binds a large conglomeration of
particularized instances. 26 In articulating its vision for the future of
class action lawsuits, the Court in Dukes departed from its common
question centric paradigm and articulated a more stringent standard
under Rule 23 that focuses on responses to a common question. 27 This
newly minted test must not be seen as an insurmountable hurdle for
access to justice against discrimination in class action litigation, but
rather as a fundamental course correction by the Court.
Proving class-wide discrimination has long been commandeered by
statistics. Imagine if almost all of the 1.5 million Dukes litigants sought
their day in court to adjudicate their individual claims of discrimination
against Wal-Mart. Such an undertaking would surely be unfeasible.
The most fundamental challenge to aggregating class claims, however,
is to find the pathway for determining cohesion among a multitude of
scenarios—i.e., meeting the commonality threshold. 28 While its
25. Emphasizing that aggregating cases without common questions of fact or law is not what
is intended for class action litigation. Establishing commonality is intended to bind the disparate
cases into a cohesive unit for trial. See infra Part II.A.
26. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (“Here respondents wish to sue about literally millions of
employment decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those
decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims
for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.”).
27. Id. at 2558–59.
28. This Article examines commonality within the context of how its contour has evolved
from pre- to post-Dukes. The commonality requirement is one of the controlling characteristics
of class action litigation that is utilized for certifying a plaintiff class. Prior to Dukes, courts
either relaxed the commonality requirement by giving primacy to predominance or merged
commonality with Rule 23(a)(3) typicality. In either instance, courts’ normal rationale was
animated by the predominance requirement that “questions of law or fact common to the class . . .
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)
(requiring “questions of law or fact common to the class”). Before Dukes, courts generally held a
liberal bias in finding a question of law or fact for the purpose of class certification. See, e.g.,
Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting the easier burden placed
on satisfying the commonality requirement for class certification). Furthermore, courts
maintained that the threshold for meeting commonality is not high and that Rule 23(a)(2) should
be liberally construed. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986)
(low threshold); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 1975) (liberal
construction), vacated by Detroit Edison Co. v. EEOC, 431 U.S. 951 (1977). In Dukes, however,
the Court conceptualized a higher threshold for commonality, perhaps in response to relaxed
certification standards in lower federal courts. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (“Merely showing
that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not
suffice.”). The complexity in interpreting commonality comes from the tension between
commonality and predominance under Rule 23(b)(3)—wherever Rule 23(b)(3) is applicable, it
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existence is theoretically elegant, establishing proof of commonality
across a large number of particularized instances is conceptually
difficult. In practice, statistical reasoning has been used to establish
commonality across a large universe. 29
The Dukes plaintiffs attempted to reinvent class certification and
flout due process through statistical elegance. The Supreme Court
appropriately intervened to repudiate class certification in Dukes. This
Article contextualizes Dukes to examine how statistical modeling in
recent class actions has diluted its applicability in drawing inferences of
pattern or practice discrimination based on qualitative and probabilistic
outcomes.
II. STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY AND GROSS DISPARITIES
OF DISCRIMINATION
The search for procedural efficiency in adjudication gave birth to
class action litigation. 30 Efficiency cultivated the need for litigants to
identify common characteristics among class members, and statistical
determination became the key to establishing commonality in
contemporary class action litigation. 31 Thus, the Dukes Court’s
difficulty in allowing class certification based on statistical evidence
must be viewed through various complexities. First, in imposing a
heightened burden for determining commonality, the Court internalized
requires that common issues must predominate over individual issues. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
While the implication is quite transparent, litigants (and judges) often conflate predominance with
commonality.
29. See Nagareda, supra note 12, at 152–57 (observing, but criticizing, the role of statistical
methodology in class certification proceedings). See also Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck,
Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass
Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 827 (1992) (arguing that statistical sampling provides an enhanced
quality of justice in mass litigation in comparison with trying on a case-by-case basis); Laurens
Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 567 (1998) (arguing in
favor of using statistical surveys to aid in injury determinations); Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 969, 988 (2007) (extolling
the virtues of random sampling for determining facts in aggregate litigation).
30. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 38.2 (3d ed. 1995).
31. One scholar emphasized the significance of commonality and the difficulty in extracting
commonality among a large conglomeration of litigants, noting,
Equity Rule 38 was probably the most straightforward of all the rules adopted to date
to provide for class or representative actions, stating simply, “When the question is one
of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or
defend for the whole.” For about 25 years, this language provided the basis for class
actions in federal courts. Representative actions could also be brought in many state
courts under various state court rules.
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 10–11 (2000).
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the difficulty in simply connecting statistical sampling with finding
commonality. Second, observing the district court’s determination of
discrimination within the subjective and localized process of corporate
decision making, the Court recognized the need to re-examine the
existing practice. 32 Third, unbridled use of statistics in class
certifications, in response to the purported goal of judicial economy,
calls for a renewed discussion of class certification through the prism of
conflict between liberty and equality. 33 The liberty principle recognizes
that all class members are entitled to their day in court, whether through
individualized adjudication or within an aggregated mechanism, 34 while
the equality principle ensures that like circumstances follow like
outcomes. 35
A. Commonality and Its Intricate Relationship with Sampling
To better understand why the Supreme Court rearranged the Rule 23
commonality prerequisite, this Part looks at how lower courts certify
class action lawsuits. 36
The class action is
a non-traditional litigation procedure permitting a representative with
typical claims to . . . stand in judgment for . . . a class of similarly
situated persons. . . . The purpose and intent of class action[s] . . . is to
adjudicate and obtain res judicata effect on all common issues
applicable not only to the representatives . . . but to all others who are
“similarly situated” . . . . 37

Class actions permit either a single individual or a handful of
individuals to represent members of the entire class and adjudicate a
series of injury claims within a single trial. Before the trial can proceed
to the causation and injury determination stages, the court must
determine whether the representative individual or smaller set of
individuals can be an adequate proxy to represent the other members of
the class. As discussed below, class certification before trial is based on
four threshold requirements enshrined in Rule 23(a). 38 In addition to
32. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558–59.
33. Id.
34. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, at 416–18 (extolling the virtues of liberty as a historic
tradition and affirming that every individual should have access to justice in some form).
35. See Yoshino, supra note 19, at 748–50 (examining many variants of equality, especially
its interrelationship with liberty).
36. The four requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) are numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (explaining
the requirements in detail).
37. Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 703 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. 1997) (internal citation
omitted).
38. See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (noting the requirements for class
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these four prerequisites, a federal class action must fall under one of the
three categories articulated in Rule 23(b). 39
Rule 23(a) tests the cohesiveness of the class. Cohesiveness is crucial
because class litigation entails aggregating a series of individual claims
in a single process, such that its outcome comports with the aspirations
of all individual outcomes. Here, connectivity is vital to the integrity of
the process, as aggregation requires binding the diverse plaintiffs into a
common thread of unified aspirations. 40 Cohesion between these
plaintiffs must therefore be carefully measured. In other words,
certification is necessary to ensure that the result of class litigation
would reasonably reflect the outcomes if all members of the class
litigated their claims individually.
Under Rule 23(a), a judge must first evaluate whether there is a
sufficient number of plaintiffs to justify a class. 41 Second, there must
certification).
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). Rule 23(b) can be explained as follows:
Rule 23(b) lays out three additional categories for class actions. A plaintiff may bring
a class action under Rule 23(b)(1) if she can show that winning her lawsuit would
necessarily mean that some other potential plaintiff would have to lose an identical
lawsuit. This happens in one of two circumstances: either the rights the plaintiff seeks
to enforce would require not enforcing someone else’s rights or the plaintiff seeks a
money award from a limited fund, so paying one plaintiff the full amount she deserves
necessarily means not paying others. Rule 23(b)(2) covers cases where a plaintiff
seeks some form of declaratory or injunctive relief. And Rule 23(b)(3) addresses cases
in which a plaintiff seeks monetary relief; it requires a plaintiff to show that (1)
common issues do not just exist but predominate over more individual issues and (2)
the class action is superior to other methods of resolving the controversy. Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes are known as “mandatory” classes: if a court certifies them,
all class members are involved whether they like it or not. Rule 23(b)(3) classes are
known as “opt-out” classes because individual class members may choose not to
participate in the lawsuit and not to be bound by its verdict.
Andrew John Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and Legal Strategy, 2011 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 319, 322–23.
40. See id. at 322 (“[Rule 23(a)] is designed to test whether a proposed class action is cohesive
enough to justify a massive trial culminating in a one-size-fits-all verdict.”).
41. Numerosity is defined in Rule 23(a)(1) as “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). While the criterion conveys
the idea of having a multitude of plaintiffs for meeting the definition of a class, there seems to
divergence among the courts in deciding what number satisfies the numerosity threshold. Rule
23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement has been a moving target for courts, and plaintiffs’ lawyers
have taken advantage of the indiscriminate standard by maximizing the number of plaintiffs
joined in a class. As a result, courts have steadily adjusted the numerosity threshold upward.
See, e.g., Dale Elecs. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 534 (D.N.H. 1971) (finding that
thirteen class members achieved numerosity); Rosario v. Cook Cnty., 101 F.R.D. 659, 661 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (finding that twenty class members satisfied the numerosity requirement for class
certification); Esler v. Northrop Corp., 86 F.R.D. 20, 34 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (finding that forty class
members met the numerosity threshold); Burkhart-Deal v. CitiFinancial, Inc., No. 8-1289, 2010
WL 457122, at *2–3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2010) (rejecting certification for a class consisting of
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be a common issue or criterion that binds all members of the class. 42
Third, the specific plaintiff in question must be a typical representative
of the other members of the class. 43 Fourth, the class representative(s)
must be capable of adequately protecting the interests of the larger class
without substantively jeopardizing her own interests. 44
As the impact of Dukes continues to unfold, the Court’s rulemaking
on class certification must be reviewed within the context of its
commonality jurisprudence. With its objective of judicial economy, the
Court’s commonality jurisprudence began in General Telephone Co. of
the Southwest v. Falcon. 45 Animated by a more liberal interpretation of
what binds a class, the Falcon Court seemingly merged Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality and Rule 23(a)(3) typicality to ensure that the
representative plaintiffs and class plaintiffs had interrelated claims.46
Following this lead, lower courts liberally construed Rule 23 class
certification requirements, especially commonality. 47 By imposing on
representative plaintiffs a burden that “is easily met,” 48 and with a
approximately 700 employees that did not meet the numerosity requirement). The stricter
numerosity requirement is perhaps an indication of why the size of classes has expanded over the
last few decades. In general, meeting the threshold depends on facts and circumstances of the
case at hand, not on any particular number of plaintiffs.
42. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–51 (2011) (“The crux of this
case is commonality—the rule requiring a plaintiff to show that ‘there are questions of law or
fact common to the class.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2))).
43. Typicality represents more of a heightened evidentiary burden that courts have imposed
under Rule 23(a). Professor Klonoff has provided an excellent commentary on typicality:
“[S]ome courts have made it more difficult to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement. In
most instances, however, the same reasoning would lead to an identical outcome under
commonality ((a)(2)), adequacy ((a)(4)), or predominance ((b)(3)) . . . .”). Klonoff, supra note
15, at 19 n.92.
44. Adequacy is more of a new import that attempts to interject elements of due process in
class action litigation. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (“[T]he
Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent
the interests of the absent class members.”); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940)
(explaining that the Due Process Clause implies class members must “in fact [be] adequately
represented by the parties who are present”). As such, Rule 23(a)(4) was amended in 2003 to add
more teeth to the procedural constraints in plaintiffs’ ability to bring class action lawsuits. As
explained in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 amendments, “This subdivision
recognizes the importance of class counsel, states the obligation to represent the interests of the
class, and provides a framework for selection of class counsel.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee notes (2003). Some scholars, however, expressed reservations to the 2003 Rule 23
amendments. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary’s Flawed Application of Rule 23’s
“Adequacy of Representation” Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671; Bruce Braverman, The
‘Adequate Representative’ Requirement Gains Some Teeth, 12 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 945
(2011).
45. 457 U.S. 147 (1982)
46. Id. at 157 n.13.
47. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 311(6th Cir. 1975).
48. Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994).
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threshold that “is not high,” 49 courts simply required classes to identify
common legal or factual questions among its members.
Falcon was about guiding class action litigation through a definitive
trajectory. Following Falcon, commonality emerged as a definitional
paradigm used to index the trajectory of future litigation. The Court
observed that a class may be certified only if “there are questions of law
or fact common to the class.” 50 Thus, Falcon opened class action
litigation to innovative lawyering and liberal judicial decision making—
resulting in an era in which plaintiffs predominantly used statistical
sampling to fulfill Rule 23’s commonality requirement. This approach
opened the class action flood gates, allowing both plaintiffs and
defendants to present a plethora of statistical evidence to support and
oppose class treatment. 51 The Dukes Court recognized this issue and
thus tightened commonality’s unbridled trajectory. In observing the
possibility of disparate questions driving individual class members’
claims and denying class certification, the Court diverged from
Falcon’s liberal construction of commonality.
Lower courts’ permissive stance on the use of statistical sampling
convinced the Dukes Court that it is no longer sufficient to certify a
class based on a common question, but rather the question must be
essential to the outcome of the case. 52 One must ask whether the Court
raised the bar on aspiring class action plaintiffs or merely retrenched an
unduly expanding trajectory. To adequately answer this question, this
Article reviews the fundamental relationship between statistical
sampling and Rule 23’s commonality requirement.
Before delving into statistics, it is important to observe that even if a
class passes muster under Rule 23(a), it must still meet one of the three
provisions of Rule 23(b). For example, plaintiffs may seek declaratory
or injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), so long as the relief sought is
superior to other available forms of resolution. 53 Moreover, Rule
23(b)(3) envisions scenarios in which plaintiffs seek monetary relief,
where common issues predominate over individualized issues, and
where the class action device is deemed superior to other dispute
resolution methods. 54 A plaintiff may also bring a class action under
49. Jenkins v. Raymark, 782 F. 2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
51. 131 S. Ct. at 2546–50.
52. Id. at 2551.
53. Id. at 323.
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Today, most class actions are certified under Rule 23(b)(3); in
recent years, however, courts have made it far more difficult to certify class actions under (b)(3)
by summarily finding, after identifying significant individualized issues, that predominance
cannot be satisfied. See Klonoff, supra note 15, at 68.

5_GHOSHRAY.DOCX

2012]

12/14/2012 4:16 PM

Hijacked by Statistics, Rescued by Wal-Mart v. Dukes

479

Rule 23(b)(1) when the possibility of victory for such plaintiff would
preclude other plaintiffs from being victorious based on a probabilistic
evaluation of winning an identical lawsuit. 55 In such a situation, where
there are limited funds, the procedure can be seen as a safeguard,
preventing the automatic trigger of an avalanche of copycat plaintiff
lawsuits on account of paying a particular plaintiff.
A detailed analysis of Rule 23 procedure is beyond the scope of this
Article. This short discussion of Rule 23(b) merely highlights that
certain class action certification provisions retain elements of
substantive due process. Second, all of these requirements emphasize
commonality—the single most important characteristics of class
actions. Despite this strong undercurrent of substantive law, procedural
developments and the desire for efficiency in class action jurisprudence
may have attenuated due process, a phenomenon discussed later in this
Article.
B. Tracing the Roots from Commonality to Statistical Significance
Keeping the stated premise of efficiency at the forefront, statistical
sampling has transformed from a fashionable innovation into a reliable
staple for class action litigation. 56 Two primary factors assisted in this
transformation. First, the exponential growth of computational speed
and computing storage capability has allowed for extensive and
effortless data manipulation. 57 Second, in emphasizing efficiency over
strict rule application, district courts allowed the temptation of using
statistical sampling as a single proxy for multiple trials to take root. 58
Statistical sampling in class actions comes from the following
conceptualization. If an adequately constructed subset from a larger
universe of data can be associated with a causal event, and if it is
deemed statistically significant, then the results of such observation can
be extrapolated across an entire universe. 59 While judicial adjudication
55. See Trask, supra note 39, at 322; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
56. See infra note 59.
57. Enhancement in computer storage and speed has allowed ease and abundance in data
manipulation. Observing this, an expert in data management noted, “The amount of data going
through the Internet is so mind-boggling that it deals in numbers that most people are unfamiliar
with. According to Cisco, which released its annual Visual Networking Index last week, traffic
will reach 966 exabytes by 2015.” Carl Weinschenk, Cisco VNI: The Long Data Explosion
Continues, ITBUSINESSEDGE (June 7, 2011), http://www.itbusinessedge.com/cm/community/
features/interviews/blog/cisco-vni-the-long-data-explosion-continues/?cs=47284.
58. See Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?, supra note 19, at 710–11 (noting the positive
aspects of statistical sampling, such as achieving both judicial economy and process efficiency).
59. The idea of extrapolation is based on a fundamental assumption that the causation
associated with any plaintiff or a random sample does not vary within the population for which
the sample in question is a part. In other words, causation applied to an individual does not
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using data analysis is as old as the history of litigation itself, the
Supreme Court’s use of statistical analysis to determine pattern or
practice discrimination in class actions began in Castaneda v. Partida.60
Decided in 1977, Castaneda for the first time introduced statistical
evidence to aid in “bringing a proof convincingly to life.” 61 By
concluding that a pattern and practice of discrimination existed based on
data showing an underrepresentation of an ethnic group among persons
selected for grand jury duties, the Court opened a new vista where a
“gross statistical disparity” became reliable evidence of discriminatory
practices. 62
The Court later utilized the same analytical test in Hazelwood School
change or vary from individual to individual. Therefore, extrapolation would satisfy the needs of
justice for all such individuals once we identify a representative sample set. See Bone, Statistical
Adjudication, supra note 13, at 573–76; Victoria Branton, A Case for the Jury?: Seventh
Amendment Rights in Asbestos Litigation, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 231, 244–45 (1998) (arguing
that “case aggregation” does not violate the Seventh Amendment). See also Manuel L. Real,
What Evil Have We Wrought: Class Action, Mass Torts, and Settlement, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
437, 446–49 (1998) (arguing for judicial economy in mass tort cases); Walker & Monahan,
Sampling Damages, supra note 29, at 546 (arguing in favor of random sampling to help in
adjudicating a large conglomeration of individual tort cases); Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort
Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499, 502 (1998)
(arguing why combing trials would not violate the Seventh Amendment). Some district courts
have strongly advocated that aggregative litigation fulfills due process requirements. See Saks &
Blanck, supra note 29, at 827.
60. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
61. In Castaneda, the Supreme Court ushered in the era of using statistics as an aid to
anecdotal evidence to prove discrimination. See id. at 495–98. See also Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (“The company’s principal response to this evidence is
that statistics can never, in and of themselves, prove the existence of a pattern or practice of
discrimination, or even establish a prima facie case shifting to the employer the burden of
rebutting the inference raised by the figures. But, as even our brief summary of the evidence
shows, this was not a case in which the Government relied on ‘statistics alone.’ The individuals
who testified about their personal experiences with the company brought the cold numbers
convincingly to life.”).
62. The standard of proof courts began to use in the aftermath of Castaneda may have
suffered from erroneous understandings and faulty assumptions. While the Castaneda Court’s
reference to disparities of more than two or three standard deviations was just a “rough”
methodology of dealing with statistical significance, courts now apply the standard en masse in
discrimination cases, without adequate interpretation of levels of statistical significance, raising
difficult legal and statistical questions. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698
F.2d 633, 647 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. United Va. Bank, 615 F.2d 147, 152 (4th Cir. 1980);
Cormier v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 211, 250–51 (W.D. La. 1981). Yet, the Castaneda
Court neither reached nor decided a floor of minimum standard deviation to support a particular
statistical significance, as reflected in the opinion’s footnotes. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496
n.17. As some courts in later years began using three standard deviations as an upper bound of
standard deviation, while using strong qualitative terms like “gross disparities,” the judicial
system entered an era of confusion coupled with an unsophisticated use of statistics. See, e.g.,
Movement for Opportunity and Equal. v. Gen. Motors, 622 F.2d 1235, 1259 (7th Cir. 1980)
(observing how courts at times have taken liberty in applying various ranges of standard
deviations for statistical significance).
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District v. United States 63 to determine whether a school district
practiced race-based employment discrimination. 64 In Hazelwood, the
plaintiffs brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
alleging that African-Americans had been unfairly discriminated against
in the district’s hiring decisions. 65 The plaintiffs used statistical
evidence to show that the number of African-Americans hired was not
proportional to their representation in the available labor pool.66
Applying Castaneda’s statistical test to the labor market in question, the
Court noted that the divergence between actual and expected
representations of American-Americans in the school district could be
explained by chance alone. 67
Both Castaneda and Hazelwood attempted to draw inferences based
on statistical models that compare expected results from a neutral
system and observed results from a discrimination-laden system.
Although neither Castaneda nor Hazelwood considered these statistical
tests as bright line rules to prove discrimination, 68 a subsequent three
decades of lower court decisions tells a story of reliance on statistical
evidence by class plaintiffs to prove widespread discrimination. 69
Extensive use of statistical evidence in lower courts is an interesting
phenomenon. While for decades plaintiffs have adopted its use to prove
commonality, the tendency of courts to readily allow statistical evidence
is somewhat surprising, especially given that the Supreme Court has
neither put forward any specific bright line statistical threshold nor
spelled out the various assumptions upon which the model produces
error-free results. 70 Judicial overreliance on drawing inferences of a
63. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
64. Id. at 307–08.
65. Id. at 301.
66. Id. at 303.
67. Id. at 311 n.17.
68. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 482, 496–97 n.17 (1977); Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at
311 n.17.
69. See cases cited supra, note 62.
70. First, the idea for the Castaneda Court’s standard deviations test originated from the
statistical interpretation that three standard deviations corresponded to a level of statistical
significance of about 0.3%. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17. Yet, use of this methodology is
neither supported by the Supreme Court’s language in Castaneda, nor derived from literature
from standard social science practice. A significance level below 1% immediately adduces the
statistical test a heightened level of significance, albeit with some other mathematical rancor. The
relationship between standard deviations and statistical significance bears the additional
assumption that the data population at issue is normally distributed, which can be a function of
both the size and quality of the data. Equally important, venturing into the innovative world of
probabilistic quantification certainly invites due process concerns; even if we use the highest
possible statistical significance (e.g., 0.3% corresponding to three standard deviations), the legal
assumption that must accompany it is that the corresponding defendant would be able to confront
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pattern and practice of discrimination using statistical modeling
following Castaneda and Hazelwood seems to be based on incorrect
assumptions. 71 In any case, the standard framework of statistical testing
utilized in today’s class action litigation draws its origin from the
binomial model introduced in Castaneda and subsequently applied in
Hazelwood. 72
The Supreme Court’s general framework of statistical methodology
for pattern or practice of discrimination can be seen as a two-part
analytical framework (with certain exceptions): 73 the first part reveals
features of the statistical sample and the second part creates a rule of
thumb for interpreting the results of the statistical test. 74 Furthermore,
sampling has specific assumptions. First, the representative sample
must be based on a randomly selected subset from the universal
population, where the representative sample must have all the
characteristics of the universe. 75 Second, such a sample must contain a
fixed probability of occurrence of the desired characteristic being tested.
Third, the desired characteristic must occur within a binary of two
possible outcomes—presence or absence of the trait. 76 Fourth, the
representative sample must be constructed based on an independent
drawing for each test. In each drawing, the outcome of prior drawings
does not affect the probability of selecting the characteristic in

and refute such statistical evidence. On a close examination, however, it is clear that, unless it is
allowed to confront each component of the sample (a conglomeration of representative sample of
plaintiffs in this scenario), the defendant has no ability to offer proof against such statistical
probability. As a result, the two or three standard deviations test fails to take into consideration
all accompanied assumptions and evidence.
71. For an elegant (and rather simple) explanation of the Castaneda Court’s binomial model,
see Thomas J. Sugrue & William B. Fairley, A Case of Unexamined Assumptions: The Use and
Misuse of the Statistical Analysis of Castaneda/Hazelwood in Discrimination Litigation, 24 B.C.
L. REV. 925, 929–30 (1983).
72. In Castaneda, applying a binomial model revolved around the determinations of n, the
sample size, and p, the observed level of significance. 430 U.S. at 496 n.17. While identification
of these two parameters is vitally important in binomial analysis, they are easier to manipulate in
simple chance-dependent events, such as rolling a dice or tossing a coin. On the other hand,
application of a binomial model to identify discrimination in litigation involves nuanced
statistical modeling and analysis. The conceptual difficulty in transferring statistical knowledge
in legal reasoning is both complex and at times non-deterministic. The Supreme Court had to
make assumptions in selecting parameters n and p for an application of binomial modeling in
Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309–10.
73. See Sugrue & Fairley, supra note 71, at 936–47 (discussing the various assumptions
underlying the binomial model).
74. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497–99.
75. See supra note 59 (discussing how extrapolation serves the interests of justice when
applied correctly).
76. See Sugrue and Fairley, supra note 71, at 935–37 (describing the binomial model as
“simple” and “useful”).
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question. 77
Courts must take great care in interpreting results of statistical tests
used by class action litigants. Sample size and statistical significance
both impact test results. Therefore, interpretations of where statistical
outcomes fall become fundamentally dependent on these important
benchmarks for a number of reasons. First, the representative sample
must be large enough to produce statistically significant results.
Second, although the Court has articulated a threshold number of
standard deviations required to show discriminatory behavior, such
threshold must be viewed on a case-by-case basis. For example, the
Castaneda Court observed a general rule that “for such large samples, if
the difference between the expected value and the observed number is
greater than two or three standard deviations, then the hypothesis that
jury drawing was random would be suspect to a social scientist.” 78
Often in class action litigation, the relationship between sample size
and statistically significant standard deviations has not been researched
adequately and evaluated carefully. 79 At times, the data distribution of
77. Id. at 929.
78. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17.
79. The general propensity within standard pattern and practice discrimination class actions is
to analyze statistics based on the methodology inherited from Castaneda/Hazelwood. In doing
so, many courts fail to take into consideration variations in sample size and fail to appropriately
connect sample size with statistical significance for extracting proof of discrimination. For
example, when dealing with a small sample size, a small calculated disparity in that sample might
be treated differently than a different, larger sample size. Therefore, for the purpose of
comparing statistically significant discriminatory behavior within a particular field, courts should
strive to analyze similar sample sizes to achieve consistent legal outcomes. In the absence of
such consistency in sample size, the observed levels of disparities should be legally treated in
accordance with the corresponding significance. Similarly, if we are to increase the sample size
for the purpose of statistical testing in the same experiment, the same observed small disparity
would then be viewed with a heightened statistical significance, resulting in a different conclusion
than when the sample size was smaller. Other scholars have corroborated this view. See Stephen
E. Fienberg, Samuel H. Krislov & Miron L. Straf, Understanding and Evaluating Statistical
Evidence in Litigation, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 23 (1995) (“A nondiscriminatory practice that
produced a very small difference in the results for two different groups would eventually become
statistically significant if the sample size, and therefore the power [of the test], were to
increase.”). Because of various faults in the standard deviation-based approach, this Article
argues for recognizing the various types of statistical significance, and discriminating between
these types of significances while attempting to apply statistical methodology for class
certification. For example, quantifiable statistical significance should not be viewed as having
similar inferential strength as those of legal significance. The power of a statistical test or
statistical significance to infer pattern or practice discrimination can vary within a spectrum based
on the number of class representatives analyzed. If other variables are kept constant, as the size
of the sample increases (for example, in discrimination cases, an increase in the number of target
subjects or discriminatory decisions), there will be an accompanied increase in the standard
deviations or variations. This would imply that any observed statistical disparities that may be
recognized as insignificant on a practical or legal basis might escalate to a statistically significant
level, raising the real possibility of obtaining a statistical result not in harmony with practical
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the original universe has not been carefully reviewed by plaintiffs prior
to developing a statistical model. As a result, any attempt in quantifying
behavioral norms to infer a pattern or practice of discrimination without
actually quantifying statistical significance becomes an exercise in
misapplied quantification. 80
This is where the significance of commonality comes into play.
Commonality within the mass litigation context involves compressing a
large, unmanageable number of individual trials into a manageable
single trial. This requires truncating numerous individual cases to a
smaller subset in order to retain and exhibit all the major properties of
the original super set. 81 Following the Castaneda/Hazelwood model,
plaintiffs have historically utilized data sampling to establish the
presence of a target characteristic within the sample data set at a
statistically significant level. 82
Clearly, therefore, determining pattern or practice discriminatory
behavior at a statistically significant level requires a series of
deterministic steps—including data construction, data measurement,
and data analysis—all of which depend on a set of characteristics
inherent within a representative sample of the target universe.
Statistically significant inferences, therefore, can be impacted by
various quantifiable factors, including sample size, data stream

expectations (and thereby raising due process concerns). See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference
Guide on Multiple Regression, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 191–92 (2d ed. 2000) (noting the relationship between sample selection and
explanatory power of inference).
80. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
81. This Article examines the commonality requirement of class certification from a data
structure perspective in order to examine linkages between statistical sampling and ascribed
cohesion among disparate class members. Binding these disparate members for the purpose of
commonality determination, therefore, requires finding both overriding and overlapping
characteristics among the putative class members. In this context, predominance under Rule
23(b)(3) can be seen as identifying some overriding characteristic where individual reliance may
be given to uniquely identify a subset of characteristic(s) from a larger subset of common
characteristics. That means the overriding element could uniquely distinguish among a set of
facially similar representatives, when such representation is based on mere possession of common
characteristics. For example, suppose plaintiffs attempt to bring a class action lawsuit on the
premise of contracting an illness from a particular drug. It is possible that a large number of these
plaintiffs actually contracted an illness; yet proving causation to the entire universe of plaintiffs
may be difficult, as exposure to a particular drug may not produce unique illnesses or injuries.
Thus, we can confront scenarios within aggregate litigation where the existence of common
characteristics may not necessitate a determination of certification, as the idea of predominance is
the ideal guidepost in these types of scenarios. See Klonoff, supra note 15 (manuscript at 69)
(“[R]egardless of the importance of the common issues, questions of individual reliance are so
paramount that no common issues can justify certification.”).
82. See sources cited supra, note 79.
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uncertainty, and various other quasi-quantifiable characteristics.83
Quasi-quantifiable characteristics include the impact on significance by
various actions, 84 and scenarios such as data truncation, 85 data
exclusion, 86 and data co-linearity. 87 In addition, difficulty in
contextualizing the underlying legal theories of discrimination 88 may be
shaped by the process of evaluating the adequacy of a given sample
size 89 and selecting statistical parameters, such as correlation 90 and
significance level. 91
83. By quasi-quantifiable characteristics, I generally mean the problem of segmentation and
quantification for developing adequate statistical modeling framework to draw inferences in
complex aggregate litigation. Segmentation followed by quantification may be necessary when
qualitative variables must be preprocessed for statistical modeling. Other times, a particular
variable may possess value only at intervals, which requires segmentation into appropriate
quantifiers, for which a statistical regression model is typically developed for identifying
statistical significance. Often times, co-linearity is not adequately taken into consideration in
making decisions based on statistical results. See Sugrue & Fairley, supra note 71, at 936 n.49
(“In cases involving continuous or interval variables, such as employee salaries or changes in
salaries, or scores on tests or rating systems, statistical techniques other than the binomial must be
used to test whether differences between groups with respect to such variables support an
inference of discrimination. . . . Multiple regression analysis permits an estimate of the average
difference between groups on a continuous variable, like salary, after accounting for differences
between members of the groups in certain characteristics that are likely to affect that variable,
such as (with respect to salary) years of experience and years of education. Multiple regression
analysis is more complex both conceptually and computationally than a binomial analysis.”).
84. Id.
85. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 602–03
(2012) (examining how data truncation might impact trial outcomes).
86. See id. at 622–24 (advocating for a calibrated approach in dealing with data exclusion by
presenting specific examples to show how values can be indexed at the outliers).
87. Data co-linearity is an issue in multiple regression analysis, which manifests itself in
significant change in outcomes resulting from small changes in input data. If data co-linearity
issues have not been adequately researched prior to the formation of sample size, it may pose
conceptual difficulty in drawing statistically significant inferences of discrimination. See
generally Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702
(1980).
88. Here I draw attention to the practical difficulty in aligning a particular legal theory with a
proposed statistical-deterministic process. The divergence between legal theory and statistical
modeling may occur for various reasons. For example, while a particular legal theory underlying
a case may point to the possibility of multiple outcomes within a spectrum, and thus require
manipulation of continuous data, applicable statistical modeling, such as the binomial method,
might provide only binary outcomes. See DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL
PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 11–15 (1980).
89. Selection of sample size impacts the difference between the expected value of a variable
and observed frequency of such variable. Selection of sample size in systemic discrimination
class actions is often a complex and nuanced process that may require selective exclusion of
members that may not represent the overall characteristics of the target class. See generally
SHEIN-CHUNG CHOW ET AL., SAMPLE SIZE CALCULATIONS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH (2d ed.
2003).
90. See Fisher, supra note 87, at 712–14.
91. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 88, at 4–7, 11–13.
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C. Commonality as a Driver for Statistical-Deterministic Steps
As the discussion thus far indicates, statistical sampling within the
context of class action litigation is borne out of the need to establish
commonality. In looking at the post-Falcon class action landscape, it
becomes apparent that Rule 23(a)(2) commonality has become a key
driver for class certification. 92 Thus, it is important to identify the
appropriate locus of commonality to better understand the relationship
between commonality and statistical sampling.
In the context of class action, identifying commonality is the search
for the invisible glue that binds all scenarios under a microscope. From
a due process perspective, commonality must be construed as the search
for a robust set of characteristics among the class such that those
common traits can effectively represent all other individual instances
within the large plaintiff universe. 93 For example, if the litigation
process evolves into a phase where the need may arise to aggregate
additional class members, the current construction of commonality must
not foreclose the due process rights of other individuals, 94 including the
defendant and those currently not part of the representative class.
Overreliance on statistical methodology for drawing inferences in
pattern or practice discrimination cases is therefore connected to an
erroneous construction of commonality for class certification. The
Dukes example is an appropriate impetus to dissect this current problem
of statistical methodology in pattern and practice discrimination class
actions. At the very outset, the factual elements of Dukes invite a
number of intriguing questions borne out of the quest for understanding
the relationship between statistical significance and legal reasoning.95
92. This Article observes that class action jurisprudence post-Falcon has elevated the
importance of proving commonality for class certification. See discussion supra Part II.A.
93. This Article contends that commonality is about identifying the common thread that binds
the putative members of the class for which certification is being sought. Therefore,
identification of commonality must be based on a robust methodology that is capable of
identifying predominant characteristics of all individual class members within the representative
set of plaintiffs. See discussion supra Part II.
94. Identification of commonality must not be based on selecting a sample in such a way that
characteristics of such sample may be incapable of encapsulating some characteristics belonging
to a subset of class members. Doing so would distort representation of the class and foreclose
due process rights of the subset identified. Despite the prevalence of statistical sampling as one
of the primary determinants of commonality in existing class action litigation, the sampling
process must go through adequate due diligence to ensure the selected representative truly reflects
the larger members of the class.
95. This Article tries to demonstrate that while it is theoretically possible to fashion elegant
statistical methodologies as objective measures of causation and injury within an aggregated
framework, applying these methodologies to fact-specific cases and judicial determinations of
causality, especially when based on extrapolating from a smaller representative sample, may be
practically difficult.
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The most difficult proposition faced by the Dukes Court was to
ascertain how a class as numerous as 1.5 million women could have
established commonality, especially when viewed in the context of
Wal-Mart’s decentralized decision making protocol. 96 Therefore, the
facts underlying the claims of discrimination in Dukes compelled the
plaintiffs to ponder a two-part quandary. First, how to construct an
appropriate representative sample satisfying the elements of Rule 23,
and second, how to adequately design the statistical methodology to
successfully bridge the conceptual gap between individual and class
claims (i.e., the conceptual gap between a series of decentralized and
subjective employment decisions and a statistically significant finding
of a systemic, corporate-wide discrimination). Indeed, the Supreme
Court may have traveled the same path of logical bewilderment.
The district court in Dukes observed that subjective decision making
systems affected all plaintiffs in a common manner (especially when
coupled with Wal-Mart’s centralized corporate culture); 97 while the
Ninth Circuit held that commonality can be established even without
evidence of a specific discriminatory policy or practice. 98 The Supreme
Court disagreed with these interpretations and took a more restricted
view of commonality. According to the Court, the Ninth Circuit’s
favored construction of commonality based solely on a common
question of law was simply too broad, noting that commonality based
only on a common question could easily be the handiwork of crafty
attorneys. 99 By introducing the requirement to seek not only a common
question, but also a common answer to that question, the Court raised
the bar for class action litigants. 100 But, what drove the Court to
introduce this new test?
Commonality is intrinsically linked to sampling efficiency. The mad
96. Establishing a representative class from a massive population that is scattered in numerous
aspects—e.g., geographically, racially, and behaviorally—is immensely difficult. Justice Scalia
echoed this sentiment in Dukes, noting the complexity in certification: “‘[T]he class
determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues
comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2551–52 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)).
97. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
98. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F. 3d 571, 603 (9th Cir. 2010).
99. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (“Here respondents wish to sue about literally millions of
employment decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those
decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims
for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.”).
100. Here, Justice Scalia cited favorably to the late Professor Nagareda: “What matters to
class certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but, rather the
capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the
generation of common answers.” Id. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, supra note 12, at 132).
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rush to seek settlements for escalated financial resolution has often
times distorted this linkage, resulting in erroneous statistical sampling
and prompting faulty class certifications. 101 The Court correctly noted
this disconnect and perhaps bridged a fallacious gap left by years of
district courts’ liberal interpretation of commonality and certification of
classes with diverse claimants. Thus, the Court’s overture in Dukes is
indeed a rightful course correction—a reminder that fundamental
notions of due process still play a major role in class action certification.
D. Using Statistics to Draw Inferences of Discrimination
This Section explores a set of questions: whether the current
methodology used for establishing pattern or practice discrimination in
class action litigation is necessarily a robust one; and whether such a
test can uphold the substantive and procedural due process aspirations
of individualized outcomes.
Employing statistical methodology in class actions to draw an
inference of pattern or practice discrimination must contend with two
fundamental issues. First, the adjudication must clearly understand
what constitutes statistically significant proof of discrimination. 102 In
other words, the employed methodology must clearly articulate how the
standard of statistical proof of commonality and significance are linked.
Second, there must be a theoretical framework behind claimed pattern
and practice discrimination such that the theory can be either bolstered

101. See supra Part II.B (observing that flawed sampling methodology in identifying a
representative class may encapsulate erroneous characteristics, thereby failing to adequately
represent the larger class members).
102. In 1977, the United States Supreme Court identified two broad categories of
discriminatory behaviors that are actionable violations under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–e-17
(1976). Title VII establishes that it is unlawful employment practice for an employer to “fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Here the
two broad categories identified by the Court are disparate treatment and disparate impact. Int’l
Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). When an employer treats a
certain class of individuals less favorably than others because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, discriminatory behavior is identified under the actionable violation of disparate
treatment. Id. To prove such discrimination, the Court ushered in a new era of analytic
methodology via its Castaneda/Hazelwood framework, in which specific statistical model is used
to calculate two data driven results: (i) an expected view based on a neutral system; and (ii) an
actual observation. Based on their difference, the likelihood of finding this actual result as higher
than the expected result is calculated. Discrimination is established by proving such difference to
be statistically significant. Here, statistical significance of a difference is analyzed within the
spectrum of a probability of occurrence, such that, if the said difference were the result of a
neutral system operated under the assumptions of the adopted statistical model, a difference larger
than it cannot be based on chance alone. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 88, at 12–15.
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or attenuated depending on available statistical data. 103
The
relationship between these two fundamental factors is important on two
counts. In the absence of a sufficiently robust theory, errors could creep
into the applied statistical methodology, which could lead to erroneous
conclusions. Also, despite developing a statistically significant
modeling technique, the lack of a robust theoretical paradigm for
discrimination could result in faulty statistical results. Only by
appropriately constructing commonality can the theoretical framework
of discrimination be logically linked with the representative sample
utilized for decision making. Therefore, identifying and establishing
commonality is central to class action litigation.
Typically, class action litigation proceeds after plaintiffs allege that a
common practice resulted in company-wide discrimination based on a
protected characteristic. 104 Commonality allows for connecting such
prohibitive practices with all class members. Here, the objective is to
incorporate each member of the plaintiff class seeking adjudicatory
relief into a cohesive and meaningful whole. The need for procedural
efficiency requires a proficient way to combine all possible claims for
which statistical determination based on random sampling has proved to
be the desired innovative vehicle. Theoretically, statistical significance
can determine the outcome for a large number of cases based on the
relative frequencies of expected behavior and observed behavior of a
representative sample. 105 Despite its theoretical elegance, this samplebased aggregate determination invites re-examination. 106
E. Castaneda/Hazelwood’s Missed Assumptions and Substantive Law’s
Unfulfilled Aspirations
Let us revisit the Castaneda/Hazelwood framework. Castaneda
explored whether a particular Texas county’s method of convening
grand juries had systematically and unfairly excluded minority
Mexican-Americans, and therefore whether such method unfairly
103. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 88, at 11–17.
104. See, e.g., Alix v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 838 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (noting
that the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart had systematically deprived hourly workers of wages
through a variety of unlawful practices, such as falsifying time cards, denying overtime wages,
and requiring to work “off the clock” without compensation).
105. See supra Part II.A (observing how selection of sample can shape the statistical
significance of differences between observed and expected frequencies, which in turn can
influence whether the court would find the defendant to have discriminated against the class).
106. See supra Part II.B (observing how lack of nuanced data analysis can introduce data
distortion within the sampling process, which may impact the fact finder’s determination of
discrimination).
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affected the criminal prosecutions of Mexicans-Americans. 107 Here, the
Court compared the percentages of Mexican-Americans in two groups:
one in the actual county population and the other in the group of persons
actually summoned to serve on grand juries. 108 By finding the
countywide percentages of Mexican-Americans to be almost twice that
of the percentage in grand jury participation, the Court found a pattern
of discrimination against the affected minority group. By noting the
difference between the actual and expected number of MexicanAmericans to have exceeded more than twenty-nine standard deviations,
the Court ushered in the era of constructing a benchmark based on
statistical sampling. 109
Hazelwood hinted at a threshold of determination of two or three
standard deviations to determine the existence of discriminatory hiring
Perhaps somewhat
practices for African-American teachers. 110
unintended by the Court, the two or three standard deviation benchmark
has become a standard for the allowable limit of statistical disparity in
class actions. Thus, exceeding this standard deviation in a case
involving expected and actual populations can be the basis for a
determination of gross disparity. 111 Following Hazelwood, lower courts
began to routinely exercise this technique without adequately
contextualizing the statistical process with questions of law and without
investing in procedural rigors to ensure it comports with underlying
aspirations of substantive law. 112 Other times, courts simply accepted
data without adequately determining its logic and quality. These errors
continued to invite substantive due process queries that may have
eventually been recognized by the Supreme Court in Dukes.
While the Castaneda/Hazelwood test of two or three standard
deviations evolved into a norm for class certification analyses, this test
is certainly not a bright line rule. 113 While the use of two or three
107. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 483–84 (1977).
108. Id. at 487 n.7.
109. Id. at 496.
110. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.14 (1977).
111. See, e.g., EEOC v. Am. Nat’l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1191 (4th Cir. 1981) (“The
conclusion was based upon an apparent assumption that if standard deviations reflected in static
work force statistics were not ‘more than two or three’ the disparities were necessarily shown to
be statistically insignificant.”).
112. See infra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
113. See Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, Local No. 30, 489 F. Supp. 282, 311
(N.D. Cal. 1980) (“The Supreme Court, while noting that disparities ‘greater
than two or three standard deviations’ would be suspect to a social scientist, has never accepted
that level as sufficient to raise an inference of intent. In the cases in which it has applied this
analysis to determine the presence of purposeful discrimination, it has relied on disparities
ranging from five to 29 standard deviations.” (internal footnote omitted)).
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standard deviations may serve as prima facie evidence of
discrimination, judges should be careful to interpret such evidence as
substantive proof of discrimination. Given the law of discrimination,
especially within the context of mass litigation, courts must be cautious
of the potential deleterious effects of conflation and evaluate statistical
evidence on a case-by-case basis.
III. THE MECHANICS OF PROBABILISTIC INFERENCES AND
LEGAL REASONING
To better understand the probabilistic characterization of
commonality, it is important to dissect the relationship between the two
or three standard deviation test and its underlying data distribution.
Conceptually, courts’ understanding of the two or three standard
deviation test as a bright-line rule comes from the typical assumption in
social science that data points fall on a bell-shaped curve (i.e., normal
distribution). This relationship would automatically trigger the
expectation of having a level of confidence between 90% and 95%
depending on the desired outcome and particulars of the case. 114 An
outcome of 2.56 standard deviations corresponds to a 95% probability
of occurrence—that is to say, a 5% level of significance—under the
rubric of a commonplace social science practice. 115 Although the
Supreme Court has not advanced a rigid rule regarding a sufficient level
of statistical significance to prove discrimination, lower federal courts
seem to have established a statistical threshold based on, or near to, a
95% confidence level. For instance, the Seventh Circuit outlined in
Griffin v. Board of Regents of Regency Universities that,
in addition to describing statistical significance in terms of levels of
standard deviation, statistical significance also may be expressed as a
probability value (P) on a continuous or relative scale ranging from 0
to 1.0. The level of statistical significance rises as the value of the (P)
level declines. . . . A (P) value below .05 is generally considered to be
statistically significant, i.e., when there is less than a 5% probability
that the disparity was due to chance. For large samples, statistical

114. A confidence level of 95% implies a statistical significance level of 5%, which indicates
that judicially determined judgments will have a disparity of one in five. If this is applied to a
typical mass tort adjudication amounting to $1 billion dollars, even a small statistical variation of
0.5% (a number smaller than 5%) will indicate a possible error of a few million dollars. See, e.g.,
In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1464, 1466 (D.
Haw. 1995) (indicating judgment of $766 million with a 95% statistical confidence level based on
a 137 randomly selected claims), aff’d, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
115. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 88, §§ 9.2–9.4. See generally MICHAEL O.
FINKELSTEIN, BASIC CONCEPTS OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS IN THE LAW 65 (2009).
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significance at a level in the range below 0.05 or 0.01 is “essentially
equivalent” to significance at the 2 or 3 standard deviation level. 116

The Eleventh Circuit echoed a similar sentiment in Peightal v.
Metropolitan Dade County: “The ‘general rule’ is that the disparity
must be ‘greater than two or three standard deviations’ before it can be
inferred that the employer has engaged in illegal discrimination under
Title VII. The Court has also called that sort of imbalance a ‘gross
statistical disparit[y].’” 117
Based on plaintiffs’ statistical expert in Dukes, the observed
difference in pay between male and female workers was within three
standard deviations, 118 which is a consistent benchmark under the
Castaneda/Hazelwood test. Yet, the Court denied class certification.
This rejection must be viewed within the context of a fundamental
relationship between sampling and commonality. The majority’s
reluctance to certify the Dukes class certainly stems from its skepticism
to use social science methodology without fully connecting it to the
legal certainty required for due process. In essence, striving for
efficiency in judicial determination may have allowed class actions to
carve out a path of least resistance. In the process, procedural
framework has been sidetracked from the goal of equality and due
process. 119
A. Commonality Deconstructed through Statistical Significance
Imagine two distinct scenarios in which a class has alleged workplace
discrimination. The first contains an estimated 5,000 class participants,
for which the calculated benchmark based on a representative sample
falls at a 2.45 standard deviation. The second is associated within a
different industrial segment and contains an estimated 30,000

116. Griffin v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Univs., 795 F.2d 1281, 1291 n.19 (7th Cir. 1986)
(citing Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 537 n.13 (7th Cir. 1985)).
117. Peightal v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 940 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073 (1992). See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 364–66 (2d Cir.
1999) (finding that a disparity of two or three standard deviations amounted to a gross statistical
disparity); Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 370–74 (2d Cir. 1989)
(reversing the district court’s ruling on account of erroneous statistical interpretation of plaintiffs’
multiple regression analysis), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990); Palmer v. Schultz, 815 F.2d 84,
96–97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing district court findings of nondiscrimination in assignments
relying on statistical methods); NAACP v. Town of E. Haven, 892 F. Supp. 46, 50–51 (D. Conn.
1995) (vacating district court’s judgment of discrimination arrived in part by an erroneous
application of statistics).
118. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 165 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“[Plaintiffs’
statistician determined that [the gender disparity in management] is highly statistically significant
(47 standard deviations).”).
119. See infra Part IV (discussing statistical methodology in class action and due process).
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individuals, for which the similar statistical parameter is a 2.65 standard
deviation. How do we treat the equality and dignity requirements
inherent in due process of law? Due process requires arriving at like
outcomes from like scenarios. However, if we were to apply the
Castaneda/Hazelwood model to these two scenarios, there would be no
meaningful statistical difference between the two cases. Since both
standard deviations fall below 2.75, we would be prompted to conclude
that the employers in the above scenarios followed neutral, nondiscriminatory practices.
Without delving into the data level complexities, it must be noted that
statistical benchmarking would diverge quite fundamentally for such a
significant difference in the aforementioned sample sizes. In fact, based
on the results of these hypotheticals, a finding of discrimination is more
appropriate for the first scenario than the second. When the sample size
of the second outweighs the first by about six-to-one, the threshold for
statistical significance must be adjusted appropriately. Thus, it may be
more probable to draw an inference of discriminatory behavior in the
first sample size than the second; likewise, it may be more probable to
draw an inference of a discrimination-neutral environment in the second
than the first. It is difficult, however, to rely solely on statistics to
determine which scenarios are alike and which ones are dissimilar due
to several structural difficulties within the scenarios’ statistical
parameters.
First, how many allegedly injured employees constitute a sufficient
sample size? In most modern class actions, the offered representative
sample is based on controllable factors, including, among others, the
plaintiffs’ trial strategy, his or her access to certain preferred litigants,
and how certain target characteristics predominate over others in those
preferred sample litigants. From a purely statistical point of view, the
selected sample should be purely random and exhibit common
characteristics such that all aspects of binomial design are inherent in
the sample. In most circumstances, this aspect of randomness is
severely compromised. Here, the lawyer involved may have a specific
outcome in mind. He or she can submit a sample for study based on
that outcome and attempt to shape the judicial outcome in a particular
direction. The class action device was designed to promote access to
justice for all. Yet, this gaming of the class action system is inconsistent
with the ideals of due process, as it raises questions in these specific
circumstances as to the defendant’s inability to confront such individual
plaintiffs.
Second, descriptive statistics is incapable of addressing the inherent
granularity of divergences. An observed statistical parameter cannot
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recognize patterns with finer granularity while also quantifying
qualitative variables. This would imply that a comparison of the two
standard deviations in the above scenarios might not yield meaningful
insight towards causes of discrimination or differences in intensities of
discrimination within the two distinct classes. If a lower court were to
apply the guidelines set forth by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits in
advocating statistical benchmarks, 120 it would be hard pressed not to
deny class certifications in both instances. Yet, the actual scenarios
may not be consistent with observed statistical results. Thus, a variety
of factors—e.g., significant disparity in sample sizes, lack of equal
probability thresholds, non-randomness in the representative sample,
and the scaling effect of sampling—all may contribute to finding an
inference of discrimination contrary to the facts on the ground.
Third, a more fundamental question is whether the
Castaneda/Hazelwood test is still legally justifiable. Perhaps, Justice
Scalia’s remark in Dukes is a stark reminder of a new realization
dawning within the context of pattern and practice discrimination class
action jurisprudence:
[W]hether 0.5 percent or 95 percent of the employment decisions at
Wal-Mart might be determined by stereotyped thinking” is the
essential question on which respondents’ theory of commonality
depends. If [plaintiffs’ expert] admittedly has no answer to that
question, we can safely disregard what he has to say. It is worlds
away from “significant proof” that Wal-Mart “operated under a
general policy of discrimination. 121

A disconnect between sample-driven statistical evidence and
plaintiffs’ posited theory of discrimination could cause either legally
insignificant or statistically indeterminate outcomes. Yet, the source of
such indeterminacy or insignificance could vary from fluctuations in
sampling to data insufficiency. 122 Recognition of the need to depart
from an overreliance on the Castaneda/Hazelwood statistical approach
would certainly require a multi-step process. First, it must be
ascertained whether statistical sampling can adequately animate the
expectation of the underlying legal reasoning. Second, before analyzing
the statistical outcome, sampling data must be sanitized to eradicate
distortionary effects of data that may be either irrelevant or unreliable.
Only through such nuanced data analysis can one eliminate the ill
120. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
121. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011) (internal quotations
omitted).
122. See supra Part I.B (tracing the roots of class actions from commonality to statistical
significance).
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effects of various data insufficiencies and oversimplifications. Failing
to do so would continue to render statistical application suspect.
The statistician in class action litigation must establish a parametric
decision making process for establishing statistical benchmarks in order
to establish acceptable legal conclusions. Typically, the statistician
should attempt to establish bounds of legally permissible practice based
on the outcome of those statistical benchmarks, which in turn should be
developed based on a prior understanding of neutral behavior. Here, a
comparative analysis of the observed frequency in the representative
sample and expected frequency in population universe based on
placement of standard variations is used as a guide to draw an inference
of legally impermissible behavior. 123 Often, what is not recognized in
this conventional statistical journey is that the materiality of observed
statistical parameters is a function of various qualitative factors. Absent
both an appropriate quantification of these qualitative factors and their
statistical significance, the decision making process may not comport
with constitutional due process.
As highlighted in the aforementioned examples, as sample size
increases the number of legally impermissible discriminatory decisions
may also increase. 124 This phenomenon invites analysis of various
uncertainties and complexities in the underlying deterministic
paradigm—for example, how closely these two parameters move, how
movement of one might influence the other, and how these interrelated
events might impact their associated statistical outcomes.
123. This Article aims to show that the two or three standard deviation test is neither explicitly
supported by the Supreme Court in Castaneda nor derived from social science literature.
Plaintiffs in pattern and practice discrimination class actions typically base their discrimination
claims on the statistical methodology introduced in Castaneda/Hazelwood. Seemingly arbitrary
statistics and a push for judicial economy may preclude participants in the legal process from
appropriately connecting sample size with statistical significance, which often times result in
faulty inferences of discrimination. In this context, standard deviation can be defined as the unit
of measurement that allows statisticians to measure all types of disparities or divergences with a
standardized term. Conceptually, it can be understood as divergence or departure from the
inherent variability of a data stream. Courts generally have seen this as “a measure of spread,
dispersion, or variability of a group of numbers equal to the square root of the variance of that
group of numbers.” Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 92 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting BALDUS &
COLE, supra note 88, at 359). Often times, courts mistakenly conflate “standard deviation” with
“standard error” without adequately distinguishing between a sample and a population. In this
context, a standard error can be viewed as a “standard deviation equivalent” of a sample. Or,
conceptually, it can also be seen as a standard distribution of sample estimators, such as the mean
around its true value. See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics,
in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 174 (2d ed. 2000),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman00.pdf/$file/sciman00.pdf (defining
standard error and noting that authors sometimes use the term interchangeably with standard
deviation).
124. See supra Part I.E (revisiting the Castaneda/Hazelwood framework).
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Understanding these nuances may indeed impact the permissible bounds
of standards deviation variation. 125
Therefore, prima facie statistical results may not necessarily translate
into deterministic outcomes for qualitative and complex behavioral
scenarios. Each quantifiable variable could be expressed as a function
of a set of qualitative factors for which there exists neither granularity
nor segmentation. Thus, observed statistical parameters would be
incapable of inferring quality conclusions about discriminatory
practices. 126 A perceived statistical parameter might be composed of a
set of numerical disparities and yet leave the court without any
discernible way to isolate such disparities in practice. Depending on the
specifics of the case, statistically determined outcomes might transform
from gross discriminatory behavioral patterns to an insignificant or a de
minimus behavioral spike.
As one gazes into the prism of the Castaneda/Hazelwood statistical
framework, one cannot miss seeing diverging colors, depending on
sample size. Thus, it is possible that the Castaneda/Hazelwood
traditional disparity yardstick moves within a spectrum from gross
disparity to negligible disparity, depending on a particular statistician’s
viewpoint. Such arbitrariness invites questions regarding whether such
a process comports with due process. For example, when would it be
proper to certify the class in each of the above scenarios? The question
raised here illustrates (and emphasizes) the existence of both a
subjective and a practical dimension in the practice of identifying
discrimination using statistical methodology.
An introspective look into the past perhaps illuminates a sobering
rationale. The plaintiff classes in Castaneda and Hazelwood consisted
of relatively small populations. 127 Thus, the straightforward statistical
analysis employed in these cases produced results showing numerical
disparity that may actually have been borne out of statistical sample
inadequacy, rather than an outgrowth of systemic discrimination. Class

125. See supra Part I.E (examining the Castaneda/Hazelwood statistical structure).
126. Pattern and practice discrimination class action cases depend on the statistical
significance used in testing. In essence, such testing identifies from the available data distribution
a pattern of behavior and draws an inference about such behavior based on the difference between
expected behavior and observed behavior. Statistical significance generally indicates the chance
of an outcome within a range of possible outcomes. For example, a 95% confidence used in a
particular test is equivalent to a statistical significance level of 5%, which implies that a judicially
determined judgment will have a disparity of one in five; whereas a 90% confidence used in a
particular testing is equivalent to a statistical significance level of 10%, which implies that a
judicially determined judgment will have a disparity of one in ten.
127. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 485–87 (1977); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 303 (1977).

5_GHOSHRAY.DOCX

2012]

12/14/2012 4:16 PM

Hijacked by Statistics, Rescued by Wal-Mart v. Dukes

497

action cases with significantly larger populations might automatically
produce large behavioral decisions, inviting numerous issues containing
even larger non-class members. 128 Here, data integrity issues could
creep in from various sources, including absent class adjustment,
inclusion of class members that have been neither contacted nor
consulted, and from class members that have opted out of the litigation.
Therefore, to develop a statistically significant outcome, a full and
robust statistical analysis is required a priori, which may only be
possible by including additional class members that have been kept out
of the original class. This process will offer more probative evidence of
discrimination (or lack thereof). Next, this Article considers the
treatment of data sufficiency, data uncertainty, and treatment of outliers,
while also connecting statistical analysis with substantive due process.
IV. STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY IN CLASS ACTIONS AND DUE PROCESS
A. Difficulty, Misuse, and Uncertainty of Extrapolation
Statistical methodology for class action litigation utilizes both
sampling 129 and extrapolation. 130 At its core, a class action is about
extrapolation—extracting the results from a small subset and applying
them to a much larger universe. Fundamentally, this would implicate
various constitutional rights of litigants on both sides. 131 Therefore, the
difficulty of utilizing statistical methodology in drawing inferences in
pattern or practice discrimination class actions is not limited to issues of
sampling or Rule 23(a)(2) commonality. Three predominant judicial
concepts deeply ingrained in Anglo-American jurisprudence animate

128. Statistical inference within a class action is based on observing behavior of a subset of
the larger putative class population, such that the subset is constructed on the assumption that it
should adequately represent most of behavioral characteristics prevalent in the original. As the
size of the population increases, so too does the number of distinct behaviors. Thus, selecting an
appropriate representative sample becomes increasingly complex as larger populations introduce
more diverging characteristics. Another dimension of complexity in selection comes from a set
of class members that remain outside the representative class, yet may contain behavioral
characteristics that predominate over the rest. Including these members would certainly
encapsulate a greater number of class characteristics, which in turn would render the selected
sample more representative of the larger class. Thus, difficulty in sampling comes from both
inclusion of representative members and exclusion of non-members, an exercise that is complex
and subjective, yet highly determinative of the legal outcome.
129. See Rubinfeld, supra note 79, at 202–03, 205 (discussing different information and
analytical procedures that aid in resolving disputes over statistical studies).
130. See infra note 140 (discussing the use of extrapolation in mass tort trials).
131. Here I generally draw attention to one of the central tenets of this Article—the difficulty
in utilizing representative samples for inferring decisions to a larger population. Despite
procedural safeguards envisioned in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the error in
judgment occurs as a result of misapplied statistical reasoning in legal decision making.
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the constitutional arguments within the context of class action litigation:
(1) the right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 132 (2) the right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment, 133 and (3) the emerging concept of a right to property. 134
Indeed, these are dynamic rights, whose concepts and usurpation is
dependent on both context and substance. The Supreme Court has
noted that these rights must not be construed as “technical conception[s]
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,” 135 and
therefore must be balanced against judicial efficiency, litigation savings,
and harmonization in “litigating identical matters.” 136 Yet, rampant use
of statistical innovations in class action litigation calls for evaluating
this constitutional rights dynamic. A simple question perhaps can best
capture the nature of such inquiry: How does extrapolation via
statistical sampling and using statistics to draw inferences of
discrimination impact the due process rights of individual class
litigants?
The use of statistics in class actions has been characterized as trial by
formula, 137 identifying gross statistical disparities, 138 and bellwether
trials; 139 yet, each of these variants contains similar weaknesses. First,
within the context of sampling, extrapolation allows a non-plaintiff to
enjoy the fruits of adjudication by relying on a representative plaintiff’s
testimony and construction of causation. 140 It does not, however, allow
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
133. Id. amend. VII.
134. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Rights and “Rights Talk,” 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106
(1992) (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991)); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). Property rights as a fundamental right within the Constitution is an
emerging concept within current discourse—i.e., discourse around the question as to whether a
certain degree of substantive protection should be accorded to property rights (drawing in part
from the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and a broader conception of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause).
135. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)) (describing due process). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (discussing the right to a jury trial); Galloway v. United States,
319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943) (“The more logical conclusion . . . is that the [Seventh] Amendment
was designed to preserve the basic institution of [a] jury trial.”).
136. S.W. Airlines Co. v. Tex. Int’l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 94–95 (5th Cir. 1977).
137. See Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” supra note 85, at 597 (“Sampling and
other forms of Trial by Formula force adjudicators to give reasons for treating similarly situated
people who were injured in similar ways differently from one another.”).
138. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
139. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 557 (2007)
(describing the origin of, and procedure used in, bellwether trials).
140. See R. Joseph Barton, Utilizing Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What do
the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J.
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the defendant a reciprocal opportunity to defend against each absent
class member. 141 Further, it does not allow absent class members to
stake claims for injury dissimilar to the representative plaintiff’s
claimed injuries. 142 Second, finding causation to a claimed injury
becomes a function of statistical variability that results from various
factors like quality, quantity, and class members’ characteristics. Here,
the due process rights of absent litigants are undermined by chance
outcomes and vagaries of data management. 143
The current concern over the apparent dismantling of a plaintiff’s
right to his or her “day in court” 144 has grown louder after Dukes,
driven in part by courts not fully appreciating the impact that inadequate
statistical inferences may have on the outcomes of class action lawsuits.
Theoretically, statistical extrapolation based on statistical sampling is an
efficiency-driven proxy for a conglomeration of individual trials, which
attempts to find the right locus between two sets of doctrinal tensions:
(1) liberty versus efficiency 145 and (2) liberty versus equality. 146
Originally intended to advance social justice, class action lawsuits
began as a conflict between liberty and efficiency. 147 “Liberty” is
intended to ensure every individual gets his or her day in court even at
the cost of limited discovery for defendants, 148 while efficiency centers
199, 212 (1999) (“Whether the courts use a class action or consolidation, courts still face the
possibility of resolving issues unique to individual plaintiffs, particularly the question of
individual causation. In the absence of congressional response to the problems, district courts
have resorted to creative procedures to improve the efficiency of resolving mass torts. In the last
two years, two United States Courts of Appeals have approved the extrapolation of the results of
bellwether trials to non-bellwether plaintiffs. Although both approaches utilize similar
underlying principles, the mechanics of the approaches differ.”).
141. Barton also observed, “The decision by a court to utilize statistics and extrapolate the
results of a bellwether plaintiff trial to non-bellwether plaintiffs necessarily implicates both due
process rights and the right to a jury trial for both plaintiffs and defendants.” Id. at 222.
Proponents of extrapolation characterize the right affected, at least for defendants, as a property
right—the ultimate amount of money damages to be paid to the plaintiffs. The right at stake in
reality, however, is a procedural due process right either to defend or prosecute the property
interest.
142. Id.
143. See supra Parts I.D–E (discussing the new framework in which statistically significant
proof is connected with inference and covering the missed assumptions that arose subsequent to
Castaneda and Hazelwood).
144. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, at 417.
145. See supra note 19 (discussing the due process principles of equality and liberty).
146. See supra note 19 (discussing the primary due process doctrines).
147. Here I draw attention to the tension between liberty and efficiency. A strict
interpretation of liberty would require courts to examine the merits of each injury claim to
determine class membership and thus clash with the class action’s objective of efficiency. See
Mitchell v. Barrios-Paoli, 687 N.Y.S.2d 319, 325 (App. Div. 1999).
148. Raising the possibility that when a class is constructed for the premised objective of
judicial economy, scenarios may arise where the defendant(s) may feel unduly penalized in not
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on the ability to circumvent the excesses in allowing every plaintiff to
testify. 149 “Equality” is enshrined in searching for similar outcomes in
similar legal scenarios. Federal class action jurisprudence seems to
vacillate between these competing paradigms, 150 and scholars tend to
differ in their analysis of this conflict within the context of mass
litigation. 151
B. Interplay among Liberty, Equality, and Efficiency
Even if one could envision a system where every class action litigant
could have his or her day in court, is it practically achievable? And if it
is achievable, would each litigant achieve similar outcomes? Courts can
bridge disconnect between such ideal conceptions of liberty and
equality through a framework of efficiency that maximizes participation
by controlling the adverse impacts of resource constraint. Some
scholars—perhaps emboldened by such ideals—espouse that liberty and
equality are structurally consistent. 152 Thus far, courts tend not to agree
with this viewpoint, especially district courts, which tend to adopt a
more equality-centric viewpoint and foreclose the path to justice in an
attempt to preserve equality over liberty. 153 Courts at the federal
appellate level, however, seem to espouse the superiority of individual
liberty above all else. 154 In this context, Supreme Court jurisprudence
seems to have been shaped by the tension between liberty and
efficiency. Perhaps the Dukes Court recognized the need to restrict the
contours of a rapidly expanding class action landscape that has shifted
from the liberty versus equality dyad to a liberty versus efficiency dyad.
On the one hand, the liberty doctrine encapsulates the aspiration of all
individuals to have his or her voice heard in court. 155 In this search for
being able to either individually confront the plaintiff or seek related discovery. See Am. Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547–49 (1974).
149. Efficiency may come at the expense of the defendant’s due process rights to confront
each member of the plaintiff class.
150. See Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” supra note 85, at 575 (“Although liberty
dominates the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, an equality principle is emerging at the district
court level.”).
151. See id. at 573–76 (discussing the conflict (or lack thereof) between equality and liberty).
152. See id. at 573–74 (“Liberty and equality are not inherently at odds with one another. In
our system of decentralized decision makers, however, a tension between liberty and equality is
inevitable.”).
153. Id. at 575.
154. Id.
155. A guarantee of procedural due process is enshrined within the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. U.S. CONST. amends. IV & XIV. In class actions, due process extends to
safeguarding the rights of plaintiffs, absent class members, and defendants. Thus, aggregate
litigation by nature might encounter difficulties in providing due process protections consistent
with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This difficulty was brought to surface since the
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justice, individuals expect a transparent and just framework in which
individual grievances are adjudicated and duly compensated. 156 On the
other hand, enshrined in the equality doctrine is the expectation that
similar scenarios culminate in similar outcomes. As society has grown
more complex, overburdened courts have started to unravel and the
need for judicial economy has taken shape. 157 Limits on judicial
resources presented a choice: foreclosing liberty for some, 158 or
formative years of class litigation, as illustrated through the judiciary’s struggle in balancing the
basic due process rights of a litigant with the efficiencies of adjudicating the rights of unnamed
litigants. Courts recognized various due process rights of defendants, such as a right to secure a
determination of certification prior to the determination of merits of the case. Rose v. City of
Hayward, 126 Cal. App. 3d 926, 937 (Ct. App. 1981). See also State ex rel. Union Planters Bank,
N.A. v. Kendrick, 142 S.W.3d 729, 740 (Mo. 2004) (stating that the court has a duty “to the
defendants in a class action proceeding to ensure that the litigation will comply with due process
and achieve a final binding resolution to the dispute”). In this context, courts in recent years have
established ways to ensure that the due process rights of absent class members are protected, such
as examining the characteristics of conflict in question, availability of other alternative means of
dispute resolution, and the facts affecting procedural fairness. Yet fundamentally, a defendant in
a class action may never get the equivalent complement of due process unless the defendant is
allowed to confront each class member in court, a possibility that goes against the very objective
of class actions. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 182
n.27 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[Rule 23] constitute[s] a multipart attempt to safeguard the due process
rights of absentees.”); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996)
(observing due process implications emanating from adequate notification of potential plaintiffs
and possible abuse of discretion under the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement). See also
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 788 (9th Cir. 1996) (Rymer, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (noting the “transcripts of a selected sample of victims” as establishing
definitive proof that the extent of injury does not “comport[] with fundamental notions of due
process”).
156. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (listing several courts’ holdings in support of
class action litigants’ due process rights).
157. The district courts largely supported efficiency over excessive procedural costs to ensure
iron-clad constitutional guarantees. For instance, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court noted:
In striking the appropriate due process balance the final factor to be assessed is the
public interest. This includes the administrative burden and other societal costs that
would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary
hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability benefits. The
most visible burden would be the incremental cost resulting from the increased number
of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible recipients pending
decision. No one can predict the extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits
would continue until after such hearings would assure the exhaustion in most cases of
this attractive option.
424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). The viewpoint that ever-increasing costs should be controlled was
further advanced by courts during the decade following Mathews, as social science researchers
corroborated using statistical methodology for legal reasoning in aggregate litigation. See Saks
and Blanck, supra note 29, at 827 (noting that “aggregate trials do not violate due process”).
158. See Barton, supra note 140, at 223 (“Although the defendant may challenge the
reliability of the particular method of extrapolation by the statistical expert, the defendant has no
real opportunity to demonstrate the dissimilarity of any particular non-bellwether plaintiff’s
claims. Indeed, in Hilao and in Cimino, the only persons who testified were the bellwether
plaintiffs. Such limited discovery and consequent presentation at trial hardly affords the
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innovating a judicial forum in which all grievances by all litigants are
heard by a judge or jury.
The search for efficiency in litigation culminated with the modern
class action. 159 Here, the efficiency model attempted to create an
equivalent of a series of individualized instances within a manageable
individual trial by integrating the inputs related to all individual
instances of a particular injury or injuries. This concept, however,
implies that the trial outcome must encapsulate the desired outcomes of
all the particularized individualized processes. Capturing a series of
numerous instances within one mechanism is intended to economize the
civil justice system such that all individuals enjoy the fruits of due
process. Here, the implications come in two fronts, procedural 160 and
substantive. 161
C. Sampling, Extrapolation, and Due Process
The statistically reliant nature of modern class actions—that is, when
extrapolated results are applied to a larger group of events—implicates
both substantive and procedural due process. 162 This aggregated
defendant the opportunity to defend against the non-bellwether claims. To require testimony by
each of the non-bellwether plaintiffs, however, would defeat the whole purpose of extrapolationjudicial economy. The use of extrapolation via statistical sampling represents an attempt to
circumvent the necessity of presenting the entirety of every plaintiff’s case.”).
159. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008) (discussing the creation of the
modern class action suit).
160. See supra note 155.
161. Due process concerns in class action litigation can arise from multiple perspectives:
conflict with underlying substantive law within the context of a multi-state class actions; conflict
with an existing federal statute; conflict while attempting to establish a procedural rule, such as
Rule 23, that may be limited by application in violation of a substantive law; or conflict from
inherent deficiencies within an underlying substantive law. The Supreme Court has held that
“[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970). The Court has also emphasized that a litigant’s “right to litigate
the issues raised” is “guaranteed . . . by the Due Process Clause . . . .” United States v. Armour &
Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). This would imply that class defendants have the right “to present
every available defense.” Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972). See Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (explaining that class certification does not mean one
should “sacrifice[ ] procedural fairness”). Most recently, the Court noted, “The Due Process
Clause prohibits a State from punishing an individual without first providing that individual with
‘an opportunity to present every available defense.’” Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S.
346, 353 (2007) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted). See Bell v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 580 (2004) (observing that “the trial management plan would
raise due process issues if it served to restrict [defendant’s] right to present evidence against
[plaintiffs’] claims”). Often times, substantive due process is implicated when due process
precludes class certification, resulting in the defendant being denied the opportunity to raise
defenses it otherwise would have been able to assert via individual action. Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 131 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
162. See supra note 59 (discussing extrapolation and due process).
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mechanism distorts equality in scenarios where like instances may not
go through similar procedural rigors, and thus, may not culminate in
like outcomes. 163 Although this inconsistency is recognized as
somewhat of a structural impediment in achieving equality, 164 whether
this also represents an abrogation of due process requires further
inquiry.
1. Procedural Due Process in Statistical Sampling
There is a tendency to conflate the concept of equality with
procedural due process. 165 Procedural due process ensures that each
individual is allowed an appropriate procedure within the parameters of
substantive due process. In other words, procedural due process stands
for the principle that when the government denies a citizen of life,
liberty, or property, the person must be given notice and an opportunity
to be heard. 166 Predictably, the Supreme Court has been consistent in
not recognizing procedural due process as guaranteeing equal outcomes.
Instead, the Court calls for reframing the characterization to ensure
availability of conditions to necessitate equal outcomes. 167 Thus,
163. Conceptually, aggregating allows individuals with diverging aspirations to experience
like judicial outcomes, which may not be desirable on two main accounts. First, from the
perspective of a plaintiff, there may be differences in perceptions of injury and compensation
being sought, yet the outcome equalizer in class actions would ensure similar outcomes. That is,
the facial equality is fundamentally devoid of consistency and the equality principle is
compromised by not ensuring similar outcomes based on perceived facts. Second, from the
perspective of a defendant, aggregating different plaintiffs into a class does not allow the
defendant to confront, examine, and challenge relevant evidence from each plaintiff, and thus
prevents a defendant from asserting individualized defenses for its alleged transgressions.
164. See cases cited supra, note 161 (listing several courts’ holdings noting the untenable
position in which the defendants are placed which in turn might implicate their due process
rights).
165. See supra note 163.
166. See generally Sara B. Tosdal, Note, Preserving Dignity in Due Process, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 1003 (2011) (discussing federal and California state due process).
167. The Supreme Court’s observation in Mathews v. Eldridge provided lower courts a
constitutional framework for charting a newer jurisprudential trajectory. See 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976) (“Resolution of the issue here involving the constitutional sufficiency of administrative
procedures prior to the initial termination of benefits and pending review, requires consideration
of three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any,
of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would entail.”). The Court
further attenuated the procedural due process guarantees by qualifying its intentions of not always
ensuring equality of outcomes from a qualitative standpoint, so long as a basic floor of procedures
has been maintained. See id. at 344–45 (“But procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk
of error inherent in the truth finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare
exceptions. The potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the
decision maker, is substantially less in this context than in Goldberg.”). Procedural due process
may not necessarily guarantee an iron-clad protection for all litigants. See Morrissey v. Brewer,
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procedural due process should be recognized through the necessary
versus sufficient paradigm, for which there exists no fundamental
problem in dealing with inconsistent outcomes in mass litigation (so
long as courts have followed the articulated procedural rules).
Therefore, the most recent foray of the Supreme Court in Dukes must be
examined through the prism of substantive due process.
2. Substantive Due Process in Statistical Sampling
At the outset, we remind ourselves that procedural due process came
to life to realize the aims of substantive law. 168 Thus, achieving legal
remedies or rectitude via transformation in procedure is dependent on
how responsive substantive due process is to the changing dynamics of
law. Within the context of class actions, acceptance of probabilistic
proof and interjection of sampling nuances have been based on group
typicality, 169 while the quantum of proof has been conceptualized as
part of a floor created to satisfy substantive law. 170 To fully appreciate
these various shades of substantive due process, we need to examine
complexities in existing doctrinal tensions. For example, better
appreciation of a perceived abrogation of equality in class actions
requires a thorough inquiry of competing tensions between liberty and
efficiency, liberty and equality, and equality and efficiency. 171
All aggregate litigation types, including mass torts and class actions,
attempt to create a sample out of a conglomeration of particularized
situations. Plaintiffs’ lawyers generally develop a trial strategy with the
typical goal of identifying the maximum possible number of plaintiffs to
share a predesigned commonality. This exercise may become
challenging as changes in absent membership may distort the minimum
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands.”).
168. In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding the use of
statistically significant sample as not in violation of the “historical understanding of both
procedural and substantive due process”).
169. See supra note 43 (discussing the characteristics of typicality).
170. Procedural law follows aspirations of substantive law in that procedure is designed to
ensure basic protective mechanisms for all litigants.
171. Here I draw attention to the tension between equality and efficiency. With efficiency
being the premised goal of class action, the tension emerges when class certification is viewed
from diverging lenses. If equality is construed such that like situations must achieve like
outcomes, then participating class members can surely achieve it within the same trial. However,
the issue becomes complicated when the judicial lens from which the dispute is viewed differs in
its certification analysis. Therefore, balancing both equality and efficiency as intended goals of
class certification will turn on how much individualized analysis a class certification process
requires, which in turn would be influenced by a set of complex factors, such as the nature of the
claim, difficulty in determining commonality, size of the class, and characteristics of class
members and their interrelationships.
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sample required to produce statistically significant outcomes. The
construction of a representative sample may inevitably face various
disturbances, distortions, and attenuations (including those members
who opt out of the class). 172 As the constructed sample may lose
randomness, the resulting outcome may not represent the desires of all
class members. Thus, sampling may provide a judiciously expedient
procedural efficiency, though there may exist some complexity in its
construction. Unless the sample is diligently constructed, the resulting
outcome may be distorted by data insufficiency. Given the limited
resources available for class action adjudication, legal doctrines must
craft a balance between individuals’ access to courts and the desire to
achieve like outcomes. While the balancing must follow a path of
judicial economy, the economization must not compromise the overall
quality of the judicial process. Sampling allows efficiency in the
process by allowing more litigants to seek justice. However, such
efficiency must not lead to a short cut by allowing a distorted sample to
represent a larger universe of litigants. Although liberty and equality
may exist in fundamental forms, their usurpation or temporal evolution
must be recognized along a spectrum.
Equality, liberty, and efficiency are the professed due process pillars
of the civil justice system. As a subset of this system, class action
litigation is not expected to use these components in a mutually
exclusive fashion. At a minimum, these components must be allowed to
coexist in a spectrum, where substantive due process can be seen as a
function of the three principles acting in unison. Here, the existence of
absent class members does not necessarily imply that equality has been
denied to such members. 173 Certainly, such scenarios do not
172. The opt-out procedure for certain types of federal class actions may present both fairness
and due process concerns. As this Article notes, by distorting the data distribution, opt out can
potentially shape the sampling process in favor of the plaintiffs, putting defendants at a stiffer
evidentiary hurdle to overcome without appropriate defenses. Further, the constitutional
difficulty with opt out is predominantly based on due process concerns, as seen in the
reformulation of Rule 23 to prohibit “one-way intervention,” whereby putative class members
could wait in the wings, watch the class action evolve, and then exercise their option to opt out
rights, thereby asymmetrically benefitting one party over the other. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).
Courts strongly oppose such gaming of the system due to the undue and unfair burden on
defendants. See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547–49 (1974)
(acknowledging rules that limit the potential expansiveness of the plaintiffs’ claims, including
rules on opting out and notice); In re Veneman, 309 F.3d 789, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Because
members of a class seeking substantial monetary damages may have divergent interests, due
process requires that putative class members receive notice and an opportunity to opt out. By
contrast, Rule 23(b)(2) imposes no similar requirements.”).
173. Rather, forming a representative sample following Rule 23 and applying applicable
statistical significance to draw inferences of systemic discrimination is a complex and
interdependent process, involving potential legal minefields arising out of the mismatch between
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automatically lack substantive due process.
In addition, how can we adequately analyze the full implications of
absent class members—often times, a set of seemingly uninterested
individuals who still have vested due process rights? First, we must
remind ourselves that due process involves an individual’s ability to be
subjected to an adjudication process for redress of that individual’s
claim to an injury or denial of right. Here, the denial of rights could
range from restriction to obliteration of certain liberties. 174 Redress
could come in the form of equitable compensation for the alleged injury
or for undue deprivation of property. The element that is missing from
this contemporary analysis is the recognition within the equality
doctrine that the theme of similar outcomes following similar scenarios
must not be identified through a particularized connectivity. 175 Rather,
it should be seen within a spectrum.
Second, due process is not triggered when a party to the litigation
seeks redress for an injury or injuries. 176 Therefore, within the context
of class actions, there seems to be a narrower interpretation of
substantive due process. Expanding the idea will allow substantive due
process to evolve within the framework of the equality doctrine. The
equality in this context comes not by adherence to “like outcomes for
like scenarios,” but rather as obtaining compensation or redress for
denial of rights. Doctrinal evolution must recognize the qualitative
nature of the redress mechanism rather than comparing the quantum of
outcomes.
While the Supreme Court focuses its class actions doctrine
predominantly from a liberty-centric view, 177 district courts have
traditionally based their jurisprudence on the equality doctrine. 178 The
growth of plaintiffs’ rights within class action jurisprudence is an
outgrowth of district courts’ reliance on an erroneous one-size-fits-all
application of the Castaneda/Hazelwood framework. The Dukes Court
statistics and legal reasoning.
174. Liberty implications could arise not only if one is denied his or her “day in court,” but
also from being compelled to a judicial process where one’s expected compensation from injury
is not consistent with one’s actual injury, or from being forced into inequitable compensation
predominantly driven by class interests.
175. “Particularized connectivity” refers to a possible and often tried act of gamesmanship,
which focuses on a subset of characteristics to shape the representative class, leaving other
representative characteristics unaccounted for.
176. Due process must be understood from the relationship between the substantive layer of
law and the procedural vehicle that animates substantive law’s aspirations. Thus, absent
participation, the social justice component is attenuated, thereby affecting due process’s
fundamental aspirations.
177. See supra note 19 (discussing the differences between equality and liberty).
178. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” supra note 85, at 575.

5_GHOSHRAY.DOCX

2012]

12/14/2012 4:16 PM

Hijacked by Statistics, Rescued by Wal-Mart v. Dukes

507

simply rectified this tendency. Participatory ideals are neither fulfilled
nor maximized when a court misconstrues due process liberty. Under
this flawed conception, class action jurisprudence may have been
viewed through a distorted prism—one that conveys that liberty and
equality are at odds with each other.
This Article follows the same logical contour as Dukes, attempting to
identify why liberty and equality are not at odds. But something is still
missing in the liberty versus efficiency and liberty versus equality
discussions—i.e., a “third dimension.” This third dimension must be
conceptualized from an inability to recalibrate the components that
underlay due process in class action litigation. By focusing on a
narrower definition of liberty, equality, and efficiency, existing
literature has erroneously colored these doctrinal tenants. Evaluating
each of these components within a spectrum will therefore allow for a
prudent introspection in understanding the broader implications of
recent Supreme Court case law.
In rejecting class certification, Dukes brought to the surface the
element of commonality (and rightfully so). 179 As highlighted
throughout this Article, commonality is the most fundamental
characteristic of class action certification. In more ways than others, the
fortunes of litigants on both sides rise and fall with the efficiency and
robustness in the construction of commonality. Ultimately, the goal of
any judicial system is to ensure procedural protection for all its
participants. Yet, in allowing more protection for plaintiffs relative to
the defendants, judges presiding over modern class actions seem to have
applied procedural protections rather asymmetrically. What about these
defendants? What about other plaintiffs like the absent ones? Clearly,
Dukes provided the necessary impetus to correct a distorted trajectory.
CONCLUSION
The general legal process for class action litigation has been overly
reliant on statistical methodology.
The use of probabilistic
methodology in the current aggregate litigation framework, which is
subject to the vagaries of the statistical determination process, is highly
susceptible to error. This Article notes that the inherent conflict
between how class action litigants collect statistical evidence and
substantive law’s equality aspiration is too fundamental to ignore. The
Supreme Court rightfully corrected this awry course in Dukes.
Fact finding with mathematical probability invariably comes as two
179. See Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2549–57 (2011) (discussing the legal contours
of commonality and why the Dukes class failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2)).
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sides of a coin. Professor Laurence Tribe has observed that “all factual
evidence is ultimately statistical, and all legal proof ultimately
probabilistic.” 180 There is great wisdom in this observation. Courts
should import complex mathematical tools for facilitating legal decision
making. 181 Yet, doing so comes with the risk of conflating the incurred
cost of using these tools with the perceived cost savings. This cost
savings on judicial adjudication has been the driving force behind
incorporating statistical evidence in plaintiffs’ class certification
motions. That is the seduction aspect. The peril lies in not recognizing
what Professor Tribe calls “the avoidable costs” of using a tool “badly”
or “irrational use[] of [statistical] methods.” 182 This Article has
attempted to inject such awareness, while illuminating the Supreme
Court’s Dukes opinion through that prism.
Professor Tribe has also proclaimed that “[m]athematics [is] a
veritable sorcerer in our computerized society . . . . [In] assisting the
trier of fact in the search for truth, [it] must not [be allowed to] cast a
spell over him.” 183 The perceived elegance of statistical methodology
may have cast a spell over class action litigation while concurrently
raising serious substantive due process issues. 184 Excessive reliance on
statistical evidence by plaintiffs in class action lawsuits has shaped the
180. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1330 n.2 (1971).
181. See generally Saby Ghoshray, False Consciousness and Presidential War Power:
Examining the Shadowy Bends of Constitutional Curvature, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 165
(2008) (proposing a novel methodology for constitutional interpretation in conceptualizing
constitutional contours as curvilinear spaces as opposed to linear paths from inquiry to outcome);
Saby Ghoshray, Applying the Curved Constitutional Space for Legal Reasoning in Cyberspace
Litigation, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 49 (2007) (advancing argument for a dynamic constitutional
interpretation of evolving issues in cyberspace law).
182. See Tribe, supra note 180, at 1331 (discussing the dangers of misusing statistics).
183. Id. at 1334 (quoting People v. Collins, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 497 (Sup. Ct. 1968)).
184. Due process must recognize protections for both defendants and plaintiffs, including the
absent class members. Erroneous expansion of a class may distort representation by not
including all pertinent characteristics, which in turn may jeopardize adequate extraction of
common characteristics for litigation. Robust encapsulation of common characteristics is
required for the efficient construction of a representative sample from the available litigants. As
commonality is the vehicle to transform the conglomeration of individual circumstances into an
aggregated whole, inadequate determination of common characteristics could result in either
inclusion of undeserving class members or exclusion of deserving class members. A sufficient
due process mechanism, therefore, calls for constructing an adequate representative class. In the
absence of an established procedure for finding common characteristics, commonality is
determined through a predominance test. An appropriate predominance test must rely on two
fundamental assumptions of law. In the event that a class is too numerous to construct, the goal is
to design a representative sample encapsulating all possible instances. Here, a predominance test
presupposes that sample characteristics are a representative subset of the universal set of
characteristics such that inclusion of any additional characteristics would not substantively
change the outcome of the class action litigation.
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procedural and evidentiary rules of class actions to such an extent that it
required the Supreme Court’s intervention in Dukes. To the Court, the
use of probabilistic methodology in the current aggregate litigation
framework is susceptible to error. The inherent conflict between the
collection methods for statistical evidence and the aspirations of
substantive law within pattern and practice discrimination was too
fundamental for the Court to ignore.
In proposing the course correction in Dukes, the Court tightened the
evidentiary rules for commonality under Rule 23. In moving away from
the long held practice of evaluating common questions to address
commonality, the Court fashioned procedural rules indexed upon
evaluating common answers. This contraction is neither an abrogation
of rights nor an attempt to impose hurdles on the path toward justice.
Rather, the Supreme Court acted as referee to correct asymmetric
influences in class actions. The elegance of statistical modeling may
have generated a false sense of precision, while in the process losing the
substantive concept of due process. For too long, class certifications
mushroomed under the simplified methodology, failing to realize that
interpreting statistics to generate a desired outcome is neither legally
permissible nor ethically desired.
The Dukes class potentially contained more than a million
plaintiffs—an example of a data set with a complex universe. When
complexity increases, so too does indeterminacy. A changing of the
guard may be required for achieving procedurally robust outcomes.
Rule 23(a)(2) commonality should not be satisfied by mimicking social
science’s statistical methodologies.185 The Dukes opinion is a
substantial step towards reining in the unbridled use of statistics in class
action litigation.

185. Ensuring randomness in constructing a representative sample in class action litigation is
the most significant objective of constructing a representative sample for the purpose of litigation,
which some commentators would characterize as the “trial by formula.” See generally Lahav,
The Case for “Trial by Formula,” supra note 85. Despite several variants, trial by formula is the
search for a representative subset that would embody the characteristics of the larger superset.

